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Just over two decades ago, Thomas Kuhn initiated a revolution among histo- 
rians and philosophers of science by publishing his Structure of Scientific Revolu- 
tions, a small volume now available in eighteen languages and with over a half a 
million copies in print. Will a similar revolution take place among historians and 
philosophers of mathematics? Who will emerge as its leader? Judging by the bold 
message of Philip Kitcher’s The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge and the 
initial response to it [l], one may ask whether Kitcher should be considered the 
leading candidate for that role. 
Kitcher’s attempt in this book to advance a full-blown empiricist conception of 
mathematics is certainly bold, even at a time when Imre Lakatos, Morris Kline, 
Raymond Wilder, and others have to some extent championed empiricist ele- 
ments in mathematics [2]. Although such authors have argued that empirical 
approaches play a larger part in mathematical methodology than traditionally 
assumed, none except Kitcher has sought to provide a fully formulated philosoph- 
ical argument against apriorist views of mathematical epistemology. Bold sub- 
themes also abound in Kitcher’s book; for example, he urges that “to understand 
the.epistemological order of mathematics one must understand the historical or- 
der” (p. 5); that “the growth of mathematical knowledge is far more similar to the 
growth of scientific knowledge than is usually appreciated . . .” (p. 8); and that 
most research in “history of mathematics . . . has been much less sophisticated 
than [in] the general history of science until quite recently” (p. 155n). 
The ten chapters of Kitcher’s book divide into two parts characterized by 
differing modes of arguing for empiricism. His first six chapters are a philosophi- 
cally formulated critique of constructivist, formalist, and Platonist conceptions of 
mathematics, whereas his final four chapters present a historically grounded anal- 
ysis of how mathematics develops. Although linked on many levels, these parts 
are sufficiently separable that historians of mathematics will probably profit from 
reading his final four chapters first. Although this review focuses on those four 
chapters, it is convenient to commence with the philosophically oriented first six 
chapters. 
In Chapter 1, “Epistemological Preliminaries,” Kitcher distinguishes psycholo- 
gistic from apsychological epistemologies, urging the advantages of the former. 
He also discusses the meanings of “a priori,” suggesting in opposition to many 
authors that necessary propositions need not be apriorist in character and that a 
priori statements may be contingent. Central to his second chapter, “The Apri- 
orist Program,” is his critique of the apriorist conceptualization of proof in 
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structural rather than functional terms. Against the structural construal of 
proofs as sequences of statements deduced by apriority-preserving rules from 
a priori axioms, he notes the difficulties raised for this view by the increasing 
commonness of proofs of such extreme length that they bestow only limited 
confidence in their conclusions. After dividing apriorists into constructivist, 
realist, and conceptualist camps, Kitcher devotes his third chapter, “Mathemati- 
cal Intuition,” IO arguing that the notions of intuition espoused by the two former 
groups are inadequate to warrant the purported certainty of a priori mathematical 
knowledge. In Chapter 4, “Conceptualism,” Kitcher maintains that the processes 
presented by formalists as warranting a priori mathematical knowledge are 
scarcely less open to objections, especially when these processes are construed in 
apsychological categories. In advancing his own epistemological view of mathe- 
matics in Chapter 5, “Toward a Defensible Empiricism,” and in Chapter 6, 
“Mathematical Reality,” Kitcher shows sensitivity to the motivations underlying 
realist and other accounts of mathematics; for exampie, he strives to avoid relativ- 
ism as well as the so-called “genetic fallacy.” His own position, stated overly 
briefly, is that geometry, for example, has its origin in the perception of material 
objects and that geometrical statements “should be understood as describing the 
performances of an ideal agent on ideal objects in an ideal space” (p. 124). In 
developing this position, he repeatedly stresses the social character of mathemati- 
cal knowledge: that it is learned from teachers and transmitted from one society to 
another. 
In Chapter 7, “Mathematical Change and Scientific Change,” Kitcher begins by 
discussing views as to the similarities and differences between the development of 
these disciplines. According to the logical empiricists, mathematics evolves very 
differently from science wherein theoretical changes purportedly result from new 
observational evidences. However, Kitcher notes, Kuhn and others have shown 
that observations rarely compel theoretical changes, which instead frequently 
result from “attempts to resolve pre-existing intra-theoretic tensions” (p. 155). 
Moreover, Kitcher cites evidence to suggest that just as historians of science have 
moved away from claims that science develops cumulatively rather than by revo- 
lutions and that proponents of now discarded doctrines acted irrationally in hold- 
ing those views, so also historians of mathematics should ask whether similar 
conceptions concerning mathematical evolution may not evaporate under careful 
analysis. For example, he notes that despite widespread impressions to the con- 
trary, mathematical claims do at times come to be rejected. His major line of 
argument in urging that mathematical change is similar to scientific change centers 
on his conception of “mathematical practice,” which he defines as including five 
components: “a language [L], a set of accepted statements [S], a set of accepted 
reasonings [RI, a set of questions [Q] selected as important, and a set of meta- 
mathematical views [M] (including standards for proof and definition and claims 
about the scope and structure of mathematics).” In these terms, “The problem of 
accounting for the growth of mathematical knowledge becomes that of under- 
standing what makes a transition from a practice (L, M, Q, R, S) to an immedi- 
206 REVIEWS HM 14 
ately succeeding practice (L’, M', Q’, R', S’) a rational transition” (pp. 163-164). 
He devotes the remainder of this chapter to discussing changes in mathematical 
language, using recent philosophic work in the theory of reference to argue that 
such changes do not necessarily entail that incommensurabilities separate an ear- 
lier mathematical language from that which succeeds it. 
Kitcher discusses the remaining four components of a mathematical practice in 
Chapter 7, “Mathematical Changes.” Turning first to changes in “mathematical 
statements” (S), he challenges the traditional view that the content of mathematics 
cumulatively increases, urging instead that sometimes earlier mathematical asser- 
tions are repudiated and that even in such a case as the parallel postulate which 
seems to remain secure, the terms in which it is expressed have undergone major 
alterations in meaning. His treatment of “accepted reasonings” (R) includes an 
especially insightful analysis, formulated in functional terms, of the nature and 
status of proofs, unrigorous reasonings, and problem solutions. Here as elsewhere 
he frequently cites historical examples to clarify and support his claims. In his 
evolutionary epistemology of mathematics, he shows sensitivity to the fact that 
the “questions worth asking” (Q) at any time in mathematics change both in 
character and urgency. The most fascinating section of this chapter deals with 
changes in “metamathematical views” (M), some of which he argues have altered 
dramatically over time, others remaining constant. To illustrate that metamathe- 
matical views change, he discusses the process by which geometry, viewed as 
foundational in the days of Newton, lost its primacy in the 19th century to alge- 
braic and arithmetic considerations, which in turn were replaced by set theoretic 
foundations. Ever careful to avoid a relativist reading of the history of mathemat- 
ics, he takes pains throughout this chapter to anticipate and dispel the charges of 
this type that have been brought (frequently unfairly in his view) against the 
Kuhnian portrayal of scientific change. 
“Patterns of Mathematical Change” is the title and subject of Kitcher’s ninth 
chapter, in which he seeks to explain “how the activities of question-answering, 
question-generation, generalization, rigorization, and systematization yield ra- 
tional interpractice transitions” (p. 194). The most intriguing feature of question- 
answering occurs when newly fashioned entities or techniques give problematic 
results or cannot readily be justified in terms of previously accepted mathematical 
practice. In those cases, Kitcher claims that “it is rational to accept the extended 
practice when the perceived benefits are greater than the perceived costs” (p. 
199). Such tensions regularly arise, he notes, in empirical science and are resolved 
by comparable methods. In analyzing question-generation, he develops the thesis 
that “changes in mathematical language and in the set of accepted mathematical 
statements rationally produce changes in the set of accepted mathematical ques- 
tions” (p. 207). One contrasting conception in this regard is that interest in partic- 
ular questions arises because of their aesthetic appeal; his own view is that careful 
analysis of aesthetic appeal shows that such interest is the rational result of the 
state of mathematics at that time. In treating generalization, he returns to this 
point in the context of considering Cantor’s generalization of arithmetic so as to 
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include transfinite numbers, which are sometimes portrayed as resulting from 
mathematicians’ attraction to the beautiful. Kitcher, however, notes that in pre- 
senting his famous dictum that the essence of mathematics lies in its freedom, 
Cantor stressed that only consistent and fruitful creations are mathematically 
significant. 
The untraditional character of Kitcher’s claims, at least when compared to 
apriorist conceptions of mathematics, is especially evident in his analysis of rigor- 
ization and systematization. Recognizing that historically mathematicians have 
frequently postponed these activities or seen them as secondary, Kitcher attempts 
to show that in this they acted rationally and that historians, misled by apriorist 
views, have been overly ready to proclaim that mathematics at such times was 
beset by crisis. The primary significance of systematization (axiomatization) ac- 
cording to Kitcher is not that it displays the a priori foundation of an area, but 
rather that it eases comprehension and brings unity to the field. In all this, Kitcher 
places great stress on the rationality of the development of mathematics and on 
the passion mathematicians exhibit for understanding and for problem solving. In 
concluding this chapter, he admits that his portrayal of mathematical change is 
imprecise and qualitative, but he characteristically adds: “Despite the philosophi- 
cal attention . . . lavished upon the growth of scientific knowledge--vastly more 
than has been paid to the growth of mathematical knowledge-our best under- 
standing of [scientific change] is thoroughly qualitative (and imprecise)” (p. 226). 
Having noted at the end of Chapter 9 the need to demonstrate that his evolution- 
ary epistemology can account for the history of areas of higher mathematics, 
Kitcher devotes his final chapter to “The Development of Analysis: A Case 
Study.” In this chapter, he presents a carefully worked out “rational reconstruc- 
tion” (p. 246) of the history of analysis from the time of Newton and Leibniz to 
the late 19th century. In doing this he advances two related theses: (1) that 
“foundational work is not usually undertaken by mathematicians because of apri- 
orist epistemological ideas, but because of mathematical needs” (p. 246); and (2) 
that “the growth of the calculus and its metamorphosis into late nineteenth- 
century analysis (the analysis of Weierstrass and Dedekind) [was] a rational pro- 
cess” (p. 270). Concerning the second, he adds: “If I have been successful then I 
have shown how, in sequence, the transitions identified in Chapter 9 can trans- 
form mathematical practice. For the episodes I have discussed involve rational 
modifications of components of the prior practice in accordance with the patterns 
of change which Chapter 9 described” (p. 270). Throughout this chapter, the prag- 
matic orientation of his philosophy and historiography of mathematics is evident; 
for example, he stresses “the difference between the pragmatic concerns of the 
mathematicians and the epistemological ideals (misguided epistemological ideals, 
I would suggest) of the philosophers” (p. 271). Nothing brings out more clearly 
the difference between Kitcher’s “rational reconstruction” of the history of anal- 
ysis and that provided by many historians of mathematics than a comparison of 
his discussion with that found in Morris Kline’s Mathematics: The Loss of Cer- 
tainty. Although Kitcher and Kline share a number of historiographic views, 
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Kline’s approach is characterized by his chapter title, “The Illogical Develop- 
ment: The Morass of Analysis,” as well as such claims as that “Newton’s third 
paper [on calculus] is as logically crude as his first one,” that in regard to mathe- 
matics the 18th century was less an “Age of Reason” than an “Age of Confu- 
sion,” and that “Paradoxically, Cauchy refused to be shackled by his own con- 
cern for rigor” [3]. 
Some of the most striking features of Kitcher’s book emerge when it is com- 
pared and contrasted with Kuhn’s Structure of ScientiJic Revolutions. Whereas 
Kuhn’s analysis has frequently been interpreted as revealing irrational elements in 
the development of science, Kitcher repeatedly claims that mathematics has de- 
veloped in a fully rational manner, although in a way that some philosophers (his 
apriorists) would construe as irrational. Second, whereas Kuhn’s arguments were 
primarily historical, Kitcher’s are characteristically phrased in philosophic terms, 
especially in his first six chapters. Third, whereas Kuhn’s book has proved acces- 
sible to a large portion of the educated public, Kitcher’s presentation, formulated 
in the precise if recondite language of contemporary philosophy and filled with 
illustrations from relatively advanced areas of mathematics, is substantially more 
demanding. The latter feature may leave it less open to criticism and misinterpre- 
tation, but will also restrict its audience. 
Three questions come to mind about Kitcher’s book. First, precisely how are 
the philosophical first six chapters and the historiographical second four chapters 
of his book related? Clearly they are mutually supportive, yet one may ask 
whether rejection of the empiricist epistemology of the early chapters precludes 
acceptance of the central claim of his later chapters that strong parallels exist 
between the development of science and of mathematics. A second and allied 
question is: What relations exist between the epistemology of mathematics and its 
methodology? One suspects that although these areas are closely related, different 
methodological claims may be compatible with the same epistemology. For exam- 
ple, it seems possible although improbable that proponents of apriorist epistemol- 
ogies will find merit in the primarily methodological claims advanced in the final 
four chapters of Kitcher’s book. Third, is Kitcher correct in his implicit claim that 
the task of historians of mathematics is to provide a “rational reconstruction” [41 
of the development of mathematics? Allied to this is the question of what relations 
exist between the successful practices mathematicians have employed in the de- 
velopment of their field (this being a subject for historians of mathematics to 
investigate), and norms as to how mathematicians should proceed (this being a 
topic typically associated with philosophers of mathematics). 
Overall, Kitcher’s The Nature ofMathematical Knowledge is a book of unusual 
importance, which should stimulate creative dialogue among historians of mathe- 
matics, philosophers of mathematics, and the community of mathematicians. 
NOTES 
I. Lengthy, favorable reviews have been written by Lorraine J. Daston (Isis 75 (1984), 717-721); 
Joseph Dauben (Science 225 (Aug. 24, 1984), 825-827); Donald Gillies (Philosophicu/ Quurterly 35 
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Philosophy qf Logic 6 (1985) 141-144); Mark Steiner (Journul of Philosophy 81(1984), 449-456); and 
Stephen Toulmin (Nature 307 (Jan. 12, 1984). 189). 
2. See, for example, lmre Lakatos, Proofs and refututions (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1976); Morris Kline, Muthemutics: The /uss of certuinty (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980); 
Raymond L. Wilder, Evolution uf muthemuticul concepts: An elementuty study (New York: Wiley, 
1%8); and R. L. Wilder, Muthemutics us u culrurul system (Oxford: Pergamon, 1981). Kitcher also 
mentions Hilary Putnam and W. V. Quine as philosophers who have “challenged the apriorist thesis” 
(P. 4). 
3. Kline, Muthemutics; especially Chapter VI and pp. 135, 169-170, and 176. 
4. The term “rational reconstruction” seems to have been introduced by lmre Lakatos; see his 
“Proofs and refutations (I),” British Juurnulfr,r the Philosophy af Science 14 (1964). l-25:7, and 
his “History of science and its rational reconstructions,” in Method and uppruisul in the physical 
sciences, Cohn Howson, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976), pp. l-39. Whether or not 
“rational reconstruction” is an appropriate description of the task of historians remains a very contro- 
versial issue, which is interestingly discussed in Daston’s review of Kitcher’s book (Note I, above). 
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Kombinatorische Gruppentheorie ist die Untersuchung von Gruppen an Hand 
von Erzeugenden und definierenden Relationen zwischen den Erzeugenden. Die 
Verfasser, von denen insbesondere der altere schon seit 1930 durch eigene Bei- 
trage zur Gruppentheorie hervorgetreten ist, geben in kompetenter Weise eine 
hervorragende Fallstudie zur Geschichte der kombinatorischen Gruppentheorie 
im ausgehenden 19. und im 20. Jahrhundert. Der Gegenstand ist gut gewahlt, weil 
er nach den Worten der Verfasser scharfe Umrisse besitzt, relativ jung und un- 
beeinflul3t von den Bedtirfnissen der Naturwissenschaft und Technologie ist und 
doch in enger Beziehung zu anderen mathematischen Disziplinen steht. “Nearly 
the entire body of research in the field is due to mathematicians who either are still 
alive or who were teachers or senior colleagues of living mathematicians. This 
makes it possible to supplement the written tradition with oral information . . .” 
(S.V). Sehr wertvoll insbesondere vom Standpunkt einer fi-uchtbaren “science of 
science” sind die allgemeinen, nicht spezifisch gruppentheoretischen Eror- 
terungen tiber die “external conditions for mathematical research”, und zwar fur 
den Zeitraum 1880-1918 in Chapter 1.8, “Modes of Communication: Growth and 
